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NOTES
PENAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT-A BROADENED
CONCEPTION OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

Prisoners in the Orleans Parish Prison brought a class action
against various officials of the city of New Orleans' for injunctive relief alleging that the prison conditions were so deplorable
that confinement contravened their right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment. The building was in a state of deterioration 2 and was extremely overcrowded. The number of guards
was inadequate, conditions were unsanitary, hospital facilities
and medical attention were inadequate,4 and inmates were
continually subjected to bodily injury and sexual attacks by
other prisoners. 5 The court stated that it had jurisdiction of
the parties and subject matter under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Held,
confinement in the prison under the enumerated conditions
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The court ordered that the conditions be corrected
6
and that a report of progress be filed within thirty days.
Hamilton v. Schiro, Civil No. 69-2443 (E.D. La., June 26, 1970).
1. The officials included the mayor, councilmen, superintendent of police,
city attorney, superintendent of fire, superintendent of the Department of
Health, criminal sheriff, and warden of the Orleans Parish Prison.
2. Ventilation through the entire structure was very poor; inmates
were subjected to extreme temperature in summer and winter; the entire
structure was infested with rats, mice, roaches and vermin; because of
faulty and inadequate plumbing, most of the building and particularly the
kitchen was permeated by a foul odor; the deteriorating ironwork was
material from which inmates could easily fashion deadly weapons.
3. Some cells only had water from the toilet because of the inoperable
condition of the hand bowl; the toilet and hand bowls were so badly corroded and rusted that cleanliness was impossible; inmates were issued mattresses, which were rarely cleaned; in the kitchen plaster had fallen off the
walls and tiles were missing; bathing facilities were entirely inadequate.
4. Prescribed medication often never reached the inmate; no survey
was made to detect prisoners with contagious diseases; there was no isolation or quarantine area for those with contagious diseases.
5. Other conditions found by the court to exist were that the cells had
no interior lighting; outdoor exercise was allowed only once every twenty
or thirty days for two to three hours; a constant danger existed that the
inmate would lose his life if a fire occurred in the prison; the allotment by
the city of $1.25 per diem per person for food, bedding, uniforms, medication, janitors, supplies, kitchen maintenance, laundry equipment, and other
needs was not adequate to provide the minimum needs of the inmates.
6. The officials in New Orleans have been very cooperative in trying to
remedy the unconstitutional conditions in the prison. In compliance with
the court's order to make a progress report within thirty days, the city
attorney outlined a seven-point plan to upgrade the parish prison by alleviating overcrowded and unsanitary conditions. The city attorney also
reported plans to build a new $12 million prison.
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Although some prisoners have applied for relief by a writ
of habeas corpus, 7 most allegations that prison conditions were
unconstitutional have been brought under the Civil Rights Act
first passed in 1871:8
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding of redress."
Until recently, the federal courts would not grant relief to prisoners under this act.' 0 The courts explained that an assumption
of jurisdiction on their part would constitute an unwarranted
intrusion into the discipline of penal institutions." This policy
of non-interference, referred to by legal writers as the "handsoff doctrine,' 2 left prison officials enormous discretion to define
the conditions of imprisonment. 1 But, while accepting the general principle that internal prison management was vested in
the heads of those institutions, the courts began to recognize
7. Glenn v. Ciccone, 370 F.2d 361 (8th Mr. 1966); Kostal v. Tinsley, 337
F.2d 845 (10th Cir. 1964); Roberts v. Pegelow, 313 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1963);
Sutton v. Settle, 302 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1962); Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d
443 (6th Cir. 1944); Johnson v. Avery, 252 F. Supp. 783 (M.D. Tenn. 1966);
Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962); Ex parte Pickens,
101 F. Supp. 285 (D. Alas. 1951). See Note, 18 WESTERN RESERVE L. Rsv. 681
(1967).
8. E.g., Roberts v. Pepersack, 256 F. Supp. 415 (D. Md. 1966). For a comprehensive list of cases brought under the Civil Rights Act and alleging
the unconstitutionality of prison conditions see 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 annots.
103-19, 189, 231, 248, 298, 317, 341, 376, 387, 430, 437 (1870). For a very recent
decision see Palmigiano v. Travisono, 39 U.S.L.W. 2150 (U.S. Aug. 8, 1970).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
10. For a complete discussion see Hirschkop, The Unconstitutionality
of Prison Life, 55 VA. L. REv. 795 (1969) and Note, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV.
178 (1967).
11. Startti v. Beto, 405 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1969); Cole v. Smith, 344 F.2d
721 (8th Cir. 1965); United States ex rel. Atterbury v. Ragen, 237 F.2d 953
(7th Cir. 1956); Eaton v. Bibb, 217 F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 915 (1955); Siegel v. Ragen, 180 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1950); Blythe v.
Ellis, 194 F. Supp. 139 (S.D. Tex. 1961).
12. Apparently so named in FITCH, CIVL RIGHTS OF PRISON INMATES 31
(1961). For discussion of the "hands-off" doctrine prior to 1962, see generally Note, 110 PA. L. REv. 985 (1962) and Note, 72 YALE L. J. 506 (1963).
13. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON

JuscE, TASK FORCE REPORT (1967).

LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

OF
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an exception to this general rule in regard to claims alleging
14
infringement of federally created and protected civil rights.
In regard to state prisons, one way the lower federal courts
avoided reviewing charges of unconstitutional conditions was
by holding that state remedies had to be exhausted before a
plaintiff could obtain relief in a federal court under the civil
rights statute.' 5 But in the case of Monroe v. Pape,16 the Supreme
Court declared that state remedies need not be exhausted before
federal remedies could be utilized. The courts also avoided complaints concerning state prison conditions when they declared
that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment was inapplicable to the states. 7 In 1962,
in Robinson v. California,18 the Supreme Court applied the cruel
and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
After Robinson v. California, the question of relief for
prisoners based upon the Eighth Amendment depended upon
the court's interpretation of cruel and unusual punishment.
Since cruel and unusual punishment defied and still defies a
concrete definition,1 9 the courts had wide discretion. As originally
14. Redding v. Pate, 220 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Ill. 1963). See also Beard v.
Lee, 396 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1968). As early as 1944, the courts recognized
that a person did not lose all of his civil rights when he was incarcerated.
Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944). See also Jackson v. Bishop,
404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968); Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark.
1965). It seems that the "hands-off" doctrine still operates to the extent
that it prevents judicial review of conditions which are the necessary or
reasonable consequence of imprisonment. Bethea v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 504,
506 (10th Cir. 1969). Roberts v. Pepersack speaks of a fine line between
mere matters of discipline and the constitutional rights of the prisoner.
15. Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961); Siegel v. Ragen, 180
F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1950).
16. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). This case was reaffirmed in McNeese v. Board
of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963). See also Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d
Cir. 1967); Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969); Miller v.
Purtell, 289 F. Supp. 733 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
17. Ruark v. Schooley, 211 F. Supp. 921 (D. Colo. 1962); Blythe v. Ellis,
194 F. Supp. 139 (S.D. Tex. 1961); Bryant v. Harrelson, 187 F. Supp. 738
(S.D. Tex. 1960). However, there were a few cases where federal district
courts did take jurisdiction when the prisoner alleged cruel treatment while
being held in a state prison. McCollum v. Mayfield, 130 F. Supp. 112 (N.D.
Cal. 1955); Gordon v. Garrison, 77 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Ill. 1948). The courts
did not use the Eighth Amendment as their basis of jurisdiction. They
were, in effect, creating a new federal civil right. Redding v. Pate, 220 F.
Supp. 124 (N.D. Ill. 1963); Blythe v. Ellis, 194 F. Supp. 139 (S.D. Tex. 1961).
18. 370 U.S. 660 (1962), rehearing denied, 371 U.S. 905 (1962).
19. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349 (1910); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130
(1878); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970); Hancock v. Avery,
301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969).
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interpreted, 2° the Eighth Amendment prohibited punishment
which was torturous, barbarous, or inhuman, 21 but over the years
22
the courts have broadened the concept of cruel and unusual.
This fact is consistent with a declaration made by many courts
that the scope of the Eighth Amendment is not static,28 but
receives its meaning from evolving standards of decency.
A striking example of the changing concept of cruel and
unusual punishment is illustrated by two cases involving the
constitutionality of the use of the strap in the Arkansas penitentiary system. In a case decided in 1965,24 the federal district
court was unwilling to say that the whipping of prisoners was
unconstitutional per se. The court did stipulate that punishment must be carried out with appropriate safeguards. Only
two years later, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit 25 declared that the use of the strap violated the
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In this
case a former director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons and
the director of the Missouri Division of Corrections testified that
corporal punishment had not been used in federal prisons for
years and only Mississippi, in addition to Arkansas, used it
officially in the state prisons. The final result of these cases
20. The phrase "cruel and unusual punishment" was originally used in
the English Bill of Rights of 1688. It was later included in the Virginia
Declaration of Rights adopted in 1776. In 1791 It became part of the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. Note, 36 N.Y.U. L. REv. 846
(1961).
21. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (concurring opinion);
In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
22. Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963); Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660 (1962); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); Hancock v.
Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969); Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp.
674 (N.D. Cal. 1966); United States ex rtel. Bongiorno v. Ragen, 54 F. Supp.
973 (N.D. Ill. 1944), aff'd, 146 F.2d 349 (7th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S.
865 (1945). For a discussion of the length of the sentence as cruel and
unusual punishment see Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 335 (1970).
23. Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (dissenting opinion); Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910);
Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1965); Goss v. Bomar, 337 F.2d 341
(6th Cir. 1964); Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969);
Austin v. Harris, 226 F. Supp. 304 (W.D. Mo. 1964).
24. Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
25. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968). In the lower court
the use of an electric shocking device, a teeter board, and whipping on
bare buttocks were likewise declared violative of the Eighth Amendment,
and these practices were permanently enjoined. The lower court also enjoined "the use of the strap as punishment at the penitentiary until proper
and adequate safeguards surrounding its use are provided by those in
charge of prison administration." Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804, 815
(E.D. Ark. 1967).

1971]

NOTES

was that corporal punishment was outlawed in the Arkansas
penitentiary system.26
Although merely placing a prisoner in solitary confinement
has not been considered cruel and unusual,2 7 certain conditions
aggravating the isolation will cause such incarceration to be
violative of constitutional rights. In Jordan v. Fitzharris29
federal relief was granted to a plaintiff who was forced to sleep
in the nude on a stiff canvas mat which was placed on a bare
concrete floor. The prisoner was deprived at all times of adequate
light and ventilation and was provided with no means to maintain his personal cleanliness. He testified that he "was required
to eat the meager prison fare in the stench and filth that surrounded him, together with the accompanying odors that ordinarily permeated the cell." 80 While not specifying the exact
conditions which must be present to meet constitutional standards, the court said that practices outlined in the American
Correctional Association's Manual of Correctional Standards
would satisfy the minimum requirements. In Wright v. McMann8' the court, faced with similar facts, described prison
conditions as being foul, inhuman, and contrary to concepts of
decency and, therefore, violative of the Eighth Amendment.
In Wright, the court took judicial notice of the directives of
the United States Bureau of Prisons3 2 but said that these policies would not determine, ipso facto, whether state authorities had exceeded the bounds of the Eighth Amendment. However, the court found it "interesting" that the Bureau of Prisons
does not permit the conditions alleged in Wright.
In Holt v. Sarver3 3 a federal district court held that Arkansas had failed in its constitutional duty to make sure that
26. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
27. United States ex rel. Knight v. Ragen, 337 F.2d 425 (7th Cir.
1964); Roberts v. Barbosa, 227 F. Supp. 20 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
28. Roberts v. Pepersack, 256 F. Supp. 415 (D. Md. 1966).
29. 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966). In a practically identical case,
cruel and unusual punishment was also found to exist in Hancock v. Avery,
301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969).
30. Jordan v. Fitzharrls, 257 F. Supp. 674, 678 (N.D. Cal. 1966). But on
similar facts, no cruel and unusual punishment was found in Roberts v.
Pepersack, 256 F. Supp. 415 (D. Md. 1966)
31. 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967).
32. The bureau requires that isolation units be adequately lighted, ventilated, and heated and kept in a sanitary condition at all times; that inmates
be deprived of clothing only for medical or psychiatric reasons; and that
toilet tissue, toothbrush, comb, etc. be provided United States Bureau of
Prisons, Policy Statement 7400.5 app. A at 2 (Nov. 28, 1966).
33. 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969).
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prison conditions were safe and that overcrowded, dirty, and
unsanitary isolation cells, permeated by bad odors, are unconstitutional. The court gave the respondent thirty days to report
their plans explaining how conditions found to be cruel and
unusual would be corrected. After the decree, conditions were
improved somewhat, but continuing complaints of the inmates
and information that lack of finances had caused prison conditions to deteriorate again prompted the court to give further
consideration to the conditions of the Arkansas prison system.
Thus, the court examined the conditions again in the second
case of Holt v. Sarver.84
The importance of this second case was recognized by the
court. In previous cases only specific practices and abuses had
been attacked as violative of cruel and unusual punishment;
this was the "first time that convicts have attacked an entire
penitentiary system in any court, either State or federal."85
To determine if the confinement violated the Eighth Amendment, all the different aspects of penitentiary life were considered. Although the overcrowding in the isolation cells had
been corrected, the cells were still dirty and unsanitary. The
abuses of the trustee system86 and the life in the barracks were
found to be intolerable. There were no precautions to prevent
sexual assaults, fights, stabbings, and killings which continually
occurred within the penitentiary. Conditions in the barracks
were made worse by the fact that inmates had access to liquor,
beer, and drugs. Other practices existed which were not in
themselves unconstitutional but which aggravated the more
serious defects. The medical and dental standards were considered substandard by the court, as were the sanitary conditions in the kitchen. The lack of a rehabilitation program also
34. 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
35. Id. at 365. (Emphasis added.)
36. While not questioning the propriety of according trustee status to
deserving convicts, the trustee system in the Arkansas prison was found to
be .su generfs. The trustees ran the prison, performed many administrative

tasks as well as guarding other inmates, had access to prison records, and
even had telephone communications with the outside world. The trustees
had great authority over the other inmates. The court felt that the trustee
guards had the power of life and death over other prisoners. A guard
could murder another inmate with practical impunity, and the danger of

such an event happening was always present. The trustees sold favors, easy
jobs, and coveted positions. Since they controlled the slaughter house, the
kitchen, and the prison store, the trustees were able to steal food and other
products to sell to fellow inmates. The trustees had broad privileges concerning leaving the farms. They often returned with weapons, liquor, and
drugs which they sold to certain inmates at high prices. Id. at 373-76.
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became a factor. The court concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits confinement under these conditions and held that
the Arkansas Penitentiary System was unconstitutional in its
present state.
The result in Hamilton v. SchiroA parallels that of the
Arkansas Federal District Court in Holt. Reaffirming the declaration made in Monroe v. Pape," the federal court for the eastern
district of Louisiana said in Hamilton that prisoners need not
exhaust state remedies before relief in a federal district court
based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was available. The court recognized
that a state prisoner has the right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment and asserted that the federal courts would
intervene in matters of prison administration to protect this
right. Like Holt, Hamilton did not declare specific practices and
abuses Of prison life unconstitutional. The judge listed areas in
which the prison was deficient and considering all of these facts
together declared that the prisoners' confinement in Orleans
Parish Prison constituted cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution.
In recent years, judges have spoken of punishment which
"shocks the conscience" as violating the Eighth Amendment. 9
Hamilton followed these cases by stating that confinement in
the Orleans Parish Prison "shocks the conscience as a matter
of elemental decency." But the judge in the instant case added
that the conditions were "more cruel than is necessary to achieve
a legitimate penal aim." This language has been used in lower
court decisions 40 but has never commanded the concurrence of
a majority of the Supreme Court.u
To apply this test, it is initially necessary to determine what
constitutes a legitimate penal aim. There seems to be conflicting
opinion as to the primary purpose of prisons. Some penologists
believe that punishment for the crime and protection to the
37. Civil No. 69-2443 (E.D. La., June 26, 1970).
38. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
39. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947); Bethea v.
Crouse, 417 F.2d 504 (10th Cir. 1969); Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970 (8th Cir.
1965); Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969); Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
40. Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969); Jordan v.
Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966) .
41. Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (dissenting opinion); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (concurring opinion).
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public are the major objectives. 42 But as early as 1870, reformation rather than punishment was considered to be the ultimate
goal. 43 Any or all of these objectives could be considered by
the courts as legitimate penal aims. Thus, it would be possible
for a court using the "legitimate penal aim" test to say that
rehabilitation is the only legitimate aim. Theoretically, such a
determination would allow courts to declare a prison unconstitutional simply because it lacked a rehabilitation program.
It is submitted that the importance of rehabilitation in a prison
should not be de-emphasized by the state and local authorities,
but the courts would be expanding the interpretation of cruel
and unusual greatly if the lack of such a program were allowed
to influence their decision. The Eighth Amendment forbids cruel
and unusual punishment. Presumably, it does not give the courts
the power to determine the penal aims of prisons. Such a determination would seem to be an intrusion by the federal courts
into an area which should be left to the state and local governments. For these reasons, the use of the "legitimate penal
aim" test in the Hamilton case was unfortunate and should be
rejected by courts in the future.
The only time that rehabilitation has been considered in
determining the constitutionality of prison conditions was in
the case of Holt v. Sarver.4 4 The court stated that the absence
of an affirmative program of rehabilitation has not "yet" been
considered as causing confinement in such a prison to be unconstitutional. However, the lack of a rehabilitation program was
considered to have constitutional significance where the other
conditions and practices were working contrary to reform and
rehabilitation. Actually, the reference to rehabilitation in Holt
was unnecessary to that decision, and for the reasons previously
stated it is felt that the court was unwise to engage in a discussion of this matter.
A difficult problem is the enforcement of the orders to
correct unconstitutional conditions. At least one judge has
threatened that "[u]nless conditions at the Penitentiary farms
are brought up to a level of constitutional tolerability, the farms
42. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 379 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
43. For discussion, see Note, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 178 (1967). A recent
Louis Harris and Associates poll of a national sample of correctional personnel showed that rehabilitation is still considered to be the number one
goal of correction. Cohn, Managing Change in Correction, 15 CR. & DELINQ.
219 (1969).
44. 309 F. Supp. 362, 379 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
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can no longer be used for the confinement of convicts. '45 This
strong language would indicate that prisoners would have to
be released if the state would not or could not correct the
unconstitutional conditions. It is hoped the federal courts can

find a better method to enforce their decisions than threatening
an action which, if carried out, would create greater problems
than the situation they are trying to remedy. The courts can
require the submission of a plan explaining how and when the
cruel and unusual conditions would be eliminated.A The court
also has the power to initiate its own plan.47 The injunctive and
contempt powers are both available to see that the orders are
carried out.4
In Holt the state officials, while admitting the prison conditions were bad, claimed they were doing the best they could
with extremely limited funds. The court recognized the financial
handicaps, but this contention by the state officials did not
prevent the court from declaring the prison system unconstitutional and ordering appropriate corrective measures to be taken
"with all reasonable diligence." 49 The Supreme Court decision
of Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County5
seems to stand for the proposition that when a constitutional
right is violated, the federal courts have the power to require
the appropriate state or local agency to raise funds to remedy
the situation. In the case of an unconstitutional state or local
prison, this would involve requiring the legislature or local
governing body to raise and to appropriate the necessary funds.
45. Id. at 383. The court repeated this threat by saying that "[i]f Arkansas is going to operate a Penitentiary System, it is going to have to be a
system that is countenanced by the Constitution of the United States." Id.
at 385. See also Bryant v. Hendrick, 7 CrIM. L. R.

2463 (Phil. Ct. of Com-

mon Pleas 1970).
46. Hamilton v. Schiro, Civil No. 69-2443 (E.D. La., June 26, 1970); Holt

v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970); Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp.
825 (E.D. Ark. 1969).
47. See McCarrick, Desegregation and the Judiciary: The Role of the
Federal District Court in Educational Desegregation in Louisiana, 16 J. Pus.
L. 107 (1967).
48. Id.
49. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970).

50. 377 U.S. 218 (1964). The county tried to avoid desegregation by closing the public schools and giving financial aid to white children in private

schools. Justice Black, writing for the court, stated that the district court

"may if necessary to prevent further racial discrimination require the
Supervisors to exercise the power that is theirs to levy taxes to raise funds
adequate to reopen, operate, and maintain without racial discrimination a

public school system in Prince Edward County like that operated in other
counties in Virginia." Id. at 233. Justices Clark and Harlan concurred in
the opinion but disagreed with Justice Black's contention that the court
had the power to reopen the public schools in Prince Edward County.
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The cases of Holt and Hamilton are a natural extension of
the broadening interpretation by the federal courts of cruel and
unusual punishment. The importance of these cases in Louisiana
today is illustrated by a recent decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The circuit court ordered
the United States District Court for Eastern Louisiana to hear
the complaint of an inmate of the Louisiana penitentiary at
Angola who alleged that the conditions on death row violate
his constitutional guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment. The plaintiff complained that death row inmates were
subjected to roach-infested food, rusty drinking water, and
filthy living conditions. The court said: "Although federal courts
are reluctant to interfere with the internal operation and
administration of prisons, we believe that the allegations appellant has made go beyond matters exclusively of prison discipline
and administration; and that the court ...

should adjudicate the

merits of the appellant's contentions of extreme maltreatment."5 1
Hopefully, the result of cases such as these will be the
elimination of the deplorable conditions that exist in many local
and state prisons. It must be remembered that in some cases
the courts were forced to move into this area because the state
and local governing bodies did not appropriate adequate funds
to allow prison officials to meet the prison needs. These governing bodies should recognize the importance of suitable prisons
to our society and meet their obligations in this matter.
Felix Richard Weill
PROHIBITED SUBSTITUTIONS v. THE LOUISIANA TRUST CODE

By last will and testament Mrs. Kate Crichton Gredler
provided for two trusts, each to comprise one-half the residue
of her succession in favor of two of her nephews.1 The testatrix
then expressed the intention that upon the termination of each
trust, if the named beneficiary thereof were not living, the
trust assets were to be delivered free of trust to the child or
children of the deceased beneficiary, and in the absence of a
living child or children, to successively named alternate bene51. Sinclair v. Ienderson, No. 30025 (5th Cir., Nov. 17, 1970).
1. The first-named beneficiaries stated that they were beneficiaries of
both income and principal in accordance with the intent of the testatrix.
The terms of the will imply this to be correct.

